Abstract-In October 2003, the United States drastically reduced the number of H-1B visas available for foreign-born workers. Such restrictions could make U.S. colleges less attractive to foreign students considering an American education as a pathway to U.S. employment. Citizens from five countries are de facto exempt from the visa restrictions, however. Our difference-indifference estimates show that restrictive immigration policy reduced SAT scores of international applicants by about 1.5% and decreased the number of SAT score reports sent by international students at the top quintile of the SAT score distribution. Restrictive immigration policy disproportionately discourages high-ability international students from pursuing education in the United States.
I. Introduction
F OREIGN students often study in the United States hoping that an American undergraduate education will serve as a gateway to longer-term U.S. employment. Rosenzweig (2006) provides strong empirical support for this phenomenon. Borjas (2002) notes that the probability of ultimately receiving a green card (permanent residency) was 26 times higher for foreign students than for those applying through the random green card lottery. Bhagwati and Rao (1999) and Chiswick (1999) are among other authors to claim that student visas are often used in hopes of securing permanent employment. It follows that a foreign student considering higher education in the United States will be affected by any significant exogenous change in the probability of securing U.S. employment after graduation. Such a change did occur in October 2003 when congressionally imposed limits on new H-1B visa issuances per annum dramatically fell from 195,000 to 65,000 for fiscal year 2004 and beyond.
The H-1B visa offers many foreign nationals with a college degree a legal, though temporary, permit to work in the United States. It is granted for a three-year period, renewable for a total of six years, and is available only to individuals in professional occupations requiring "the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge requiring completion of a specific course of higher education." 1 The drastic cut in the H-1B quota beginning in fiscal year 2004 represented a marked exogenous change in U.S. job market prospects for college-educated foreign citizens. The H-1B visa cap was never binding in the years immediately preceding the policy change. Thus, foreign citizens with undergraduate degrees faced no legal impediment to working in the United States as long as they had received a job offer from an employer. Legal employment became more difficult to secure after the cap became binding. The U.S. government began denying H-1B petitions, which generated an incentive for employers to withdraw (or decide against) job offers to foreign candidates and avoid the uncertainty of the visa process. That visa quotas in general reduce U.S. immigrant flows is already well established in the literature. This paper instead assesses how restrictive H-1B policy has affected the average academic quality (or ability) of prospective international students who face reduced U.S. employment opportunity after graduation.
Section II begins with a discussion of past literature and motivation. Section III turns to our empirical strategy, providing a discussion to motivate the empirical analysis, a brief history of H-1B policy and legislation, a description of the data, and our main regression specification. Importantly, collegeeducated citizens of five key control countries-Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Singapore-can acquire work permits that are close substitutes for the H-1B visa. Thus, workers from those countries are less bound by H-1B restrictions. This allows us to employ difference-in-difference estimation to identify the effect of current policy on the selection of foreign students interested in a U.S. education.
Section IV presents the empirical results. We begin with a College Board data set measuring the SAT scores of international test takers. We find that visa restrictions have reduced SAT scores of prospective students by 10 to 20 points. Log regressions suggest a loss of 0.6% to 1.5%. These effects are robust to controls for macroeconomic conditions and the inclusion or exclusion of particular countries in the analysis.
College Board data also demonstrate that reduced SAT scores are driven by a marked decline in the number of score reports sent from students at the top quintile of the ability distribution as opposed to an increased number of applications from lower-ability students.
The College Board data set presents a few limitations, however. First, SAT scores are not the only relevant gauge of academic quality used by U.S. college admission offices, and some researchers argue that high school grade point average (GPA) is a superior measure (Geiser & Santelices, 2007; Rask & Tiefenthaler, 2009 ). Though we believe that the use of SAT scores may be more justifiable for international applicants, it is of significant value to test the robustness of our key results
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to the use of an alternative quality measure. Second, although the College Board provides data on prospective international students, we cannot be sure that all of them become actual college applicants. Finally, the data set is complicated by timing issues. We cannot precisely identify dates in which students sent SAT score reports, which may be a problem for individuals taking the exam near policy change dates.
We address these issues by turning to an alternative case study data set of applicants to a highly selective university. This data set provides a measure of standardized high school GPA, includes international applicants only, and is less encumbered by timing issues. Our case study analysis uncovers ability losses comparable in magnitude to those found using College Board data, pointing to the robustness of our findings.
II. Literature and Motivation
Current political and economic debate necessitates better understanding of how policy affects immigration among highly educated workers. Politically, Americans maintain more favorable attitudes toward highly educated immigrants compared to less educated ones. A 2007 CBS News/New York Times poll (Preston & Connelly, 2007) revealed that 51% of respondents believe U.S. immigration policy should favor people based on education and job skills, results echoed by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) . In March 2010, Senators Lindsey Graham and Charles Schumer launched a bipartisan call for comprehensive immigration reform that included a preference for foreign labor with advanced degrees in science, mathematics, engineering, and technology. That effort resurfaced in February 2011. 2 Nonetheless, immigration among highly educated workers remains controversial. U.S. legislation favoring skill-based immigration has yet to find majority support in Congress, while the H-1B visa restrictions introduced in 2003 continue to be in effect.
Economists have highlighted the potential for both positive and negative effects of highly educated immigration. Those who focus on the costs of skilled immigration emphasize distributional concerns. Hira (2007) , Miano (2007) , Stephan and Levin (2007) , and Borjas (1999 Borjas ( , 2006 warn that highly educated immigrants could reduce employment and wage opportunities for similarly educated natives. This includes, for example, the proliferation of low-paying postdoctoral positions expected of new science Ph.D. graduates before finding permanent employment. Similarly, Borjas (2002 Borjas ( , 2007 worries that immigrants alter the educational plans of natives and crowd them out of science and engineering programs within universities. 3 2 See Graham and Schumer (2010) , Preston (2010) , and Budoff Brown (2011) .
3 Peri and Sparber (2011) , in contrast, suggest that comparative advantages among highly educated native and foreign-born workers should protect natives from competition and mitigate potential wage losses. Similarly, results in Kerr and Lincoln (2010) suggest that highly educated workers on H-1B visas do not crowd out natives.
Even if immigrants are not explicitly crowding out natives, it is clear that foreign workers are becoming more prominent in U.S. math and science. Stephan and Levin (2007) quote an American Mathematical Society statistic that 40% of U.S. mathematics jobs in 1995 were awarded to immigrants. Levin et al. (2004) note that while the number of science and engineering doctoral recipients who live in the United States and hold U.S. citizenship rose threefold between 1973 and 1997, the number of noncitizen recipients had grown eightfold. By 1997, 20% of U.S. scientists were noncitizens at the time of doctoral degree receipt. 4 More sanguine views of highly educated immigration focus on the far-reaching macroeconomic effects. Hunt (2009) demonstrates that immigrants are particularly innovative and entrepreneurial. Compared to natives, they are more adept at patenting, licensing their patents, and publishing. This advantage of immigrants over natives is largely explained by educational differences between the two groups (degree and field of study). However, immigrants are more likely to start new companies than natives are, even after controlling for education. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) provide concurring evidence for the innovative gains of highly educated immigration by focusing specifically on the H-1B program. They argue that H-1B admissions increase total patenting as well as patenting by U.S. residents with Indian and Chinese passports in U.S. cities and firms that are dependent on highly educated foreign-born workers. Further evidence for the technology-and productivity-enhancing effects of highly educated immigration can be found in Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) , Stephan and Levin (2007) , Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo (2005) , and Borjas (1999) . Freeman (2009) argues that the comparative U.S. advantage in science and technology is severely threatened by educational trends in the United States and abroad. He reports that 29% of the world's college students were enrolled in U.S. schools in 1970, but that figure declined to just 12% in 2006. In the mid-1980s, 37.8% of the world's students studying abroad chose to matriculate in U.S. universities. That number declined to 20% in [2006] [2007] . These reductions will hit science and engineering fields particularly hard. Foreigners represented 15% of science and engineering workers with a bachelor's degree and a third of those with a doctorate. Most of those foreign-born workers were educated in the United States. 5 Freeman predicts that these trends together imply that wages of skilled U.S. workers will decline, as will the price of U.S. high-tech exports.
Freeman's analysis suggests that it is not just the consequences of immigration that matters but also the causes. Research on the determinants of migration flows began with Sjaastad (1962) and gained popularity after Borjas (1987) .
QUOTAS AND QUALITY
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Most studies employ a cross-section or panel of countries to assess the macroeconomic determinants of aggregate migration flows. Mayda (2010) , for example, employs a panel of fourteen OECD destination countries and shows that pull factors, such as high GDP in destination countries, are more important than push factors, such as low GDP in origin countries, in driving migration decisions. As immigration policy in host countries becomes less restrictive, both push and pull factors become more important. Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007) provide a more direct test of the consequences of U.S. immigration policy over the period. Using a panel of 81 source countries over 28 years, they report, "The effects of immigration policy are discernible and have the expected effects. . . . An increase in 10% in the family quota raises immigration from a country by 0.3%. The same proportionate increase in employment visas raise it by 1.4%. A 10% increase in the refugee allowance raises immigration by 0.5%, while the effect of the diversity quota is minimal" (p. 365).
Less work has been done on the effect of policy on the quality (as opposed to quantity) of immigrants. For research on skilled immigrants, however, quality issues may be even more important than quantity. Rosenzweig (2006) focuses on the determinants of foreign student flows, an interesting case for analysis because student flows are considerably larger than other skill-based flows, while there is no country-specific or total ceiling on student visas. He proposes that students are likely to be particularly motivated by economics. Other immigrant groups are often driven by family ties or, in the case of refugees, political forces. His empirical results support this view, finding that students immigrate not due to a lack of educational opportunity at home, but rather due to the lure of greater economic prosperity in the United States. He concludes by arguing that foreign students go to the United States in hopes of permanent employment, even though only a fraction actually remains after graduation. Chiswick (2000) surveys the empirical literature and offers a theoretical model of migrant selectivity. He argues that migrants are favorably self-selected. If the direct costs of migration rise or if ability is negatively correlated with the costs of migration, this favorable self-selectivity grows stronger. Chen (2005) provides a short case study of the quality of masters degree students in a Chinese university and their interest in migrating to the United States for continued education. He finds that potential emigrants were negatively self-selected during a less restrictive policy regime but positively selected during a more restrictive regime. However, the paper is vague about which policies were in question, and it is not clear that they would have targeted or restricted highly educated workers.
In short, there is little, if any, disagreement among researchers about whether immigration quotas affect the quantity of immigration flows. However, researchers are less certain about effects on the quality of immigrants. For highly educated immigration, the skills of those who decide to migrate is at least as important as how many workers choose to do so. Sanguine views of immigration are discounted if the quality of the immigrant pool declines, while U.S. higher education might also suffer. We aim to fill this important gap in the literature by providing rigorous evidence on the effects of restrictive foreign-born labor policy (reductions in H1-B quotas) on the quality of undergraduate applications that U.S. colleges and universities receive.
III. Empirical Strategy
A. Discussion on Immigration Policy and Student Migration Decisions
Simple thought experiments demonstrate that restrictive foreign-born labor policy can affect the average quality of potential foreign applicants to U.S. higher education. The direction of the effect, however, is ambiguous and depends on which tail of the applicant ability distribution is more strongly affected. 6 If high-ability students are particularly sensitive to labor policy changes, immigration restrictions could reduce the average quality of international applicants to U.S. higher education. This might arise, for example, if high-ability foreign nationals are simply more aware of U.S. legislation. More interestingly, suppose that prospective undergraduate students think about future U.S. employment opportunities when considering U.S. education. Further assume that low-ability immigrants are unlikely to find desirable U.S. employment even in the absence of visa restrictions (thus making employment quotas largely irrelevant to them), whereas highability immigrants confront U.S. employment difficulty only when immigration barriers exist. Immigrant labor restrictions would then have little effect on students at the left tail of the ability distribution, but right-tail students would experience a decline in both the ex ante probability of securing U.S. employment and the expected net benefit of attending U.S. undergraduate institutions. In both cases, restrictive immigration policy disproportionately discourages high-ability international students from applying to U.S. schools, thereby reducing the average ability of the foreign applicant pool.
The opposite prediction is also theoretically possible. Suppose that restrictive policy induces U.S. employers to seek scarce employment visas only for high-quality foreign workers. High-ability students might then expect a reasonable number of employment opportunities on graduation, whereas low-ability students sense that few firms will work at securing employment visas for them. In this scenario, it is the low-ability students who are most sensitive to foreign-born labor restrictions: employment barriers disproportionately deter the left tail of the ability distribution from U.S. education, thus increasing the average quality of international applicants.
It is clear that foreign-born labor restrictions can alter the average quality of international applicants to U.S.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS undergraduate institutions, but the direction of the effect is theoretically ambiguous. Rigorous empirical analysis is needed to better understand the direction and size of policy consequences.
B. History of H-1B Policy
The Immigration Act of 1990 Act of (implemented in 1992 created the H-1B visa for professional foreign nationals seeking temporary employment in the United States. Kapur and McHale (2005) report that 98% of H-1B approvals go to individuals with a bachelor's degree or more education. Though government statistics do not record the location of an H-1B recipient's undergraduate degree, figure 1 offers descriptive cross-country evidence that a 1% rise in undergraduate enrollment is associated with an equivalent rise in H-1B visas issued four years later, controlling for country population size. 7 Given that foreign students study in the United States hoping to secure longer-term employment (as evidenced by Rosenzweig, 2006; Borjas, 2002; Bhagwati & Rao, 1999; Chiswick, 1999; and others) , prospective students should be sensitive to H-1B policy changes.
At the time of its creation, 65,000 H-1B visas became available for new applicants each year. The cap was not reached until fiscal year 1997 and again in 1998. In October 1998, Congress enacted the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA), which temporarily raised the cap to 115,000 for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 and to 107,000 for 2001. The 1999 limit was accidentally exceeded by 22,000, an oversight for which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was ultimately forgiven. 8 The 2000 limit was reached six months prior to the end of the fiscal year. Congress responded to the increase in demand for H-1B visas with the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act (AC21), signed by President Clinton in October 2000. The act had two relevant effects. First, it reduced the number of H-1B visas that counted toward the quota by exempting employees of universities, nonprofit research organizations, and governmental research organizations. Second, it raised the cap to 195,000 for each of 2001, 2002, and 2003 restrictive labor laws, Congress did not enact wide-ranging legislation to maintain the high quota. As a result, the H-1B cap has been binding every year in our sample since 2004. 9 We assume that although high caps were temporary, there was a reasonable expectation of permanence. The trend had been for a rising cap, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was forgiven for exceeding the cap in 1999. By fall 2003, however, it was clear that there would be no renewal. Most international students considering matriculation after that date (beginning in fall 2004) would expect limited access to the U.S. labor market. In our research design, potential foreign applicants to U.S. colleges can be seen as having received a "treatment" in fall 2003 (that is, an exogenous decline in the expected probability of securing employment in the U.S. after graduation).
Potential foreign applicants from five key countries were unaffected by this treatment and the H-1B visa cap reduction, however. Free trade agreements have created close H-1B substitutes for citizens from Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Australia. First, the North American Free Trade Agreement created the TN (Trade NAFTA) visa for professionals from Canada and Mexico. 10 Although the approved list of occupations is more restrictive than the H-1B, each occupation is associated with college degree holders. 11 There is no 
-Visa Issuances
The charts describe the number of new visa issuances by type and country since 2000 (U.S. State Department, n.d.) . College-educated citizens from Canada, Mexico, Australia, Chile, and Singapore have viable alternatives to the H1B visa. Canadian citizens do not require H-1B or TN visas to work in the United States but do need to meet H-1B or TN criteria.
limit to the number of TN visas that can be issued. Second, two free trade agreements signed by President Bush on September 3, 2003, created the H-1B1 program by setting aside up to 5,400 of the annual H-1B visas for citizens of Singapore and up to 1,400 for Chileans. Another bill, signed on May 11, 2005, established 10,500 annual E-3 visas for Australian professionals. The caps on E-3 and H-1B1 visas have never been reached (H-1B1 visas set aside for citizens of Singapore and Chile are subtracted from the overall H-1B visa quota, however, unused H-1B1 visas are made available as H-1B visas to citizens of other countries). Figure 2 demonstrates that workers from these countries indeed choose alternative routes of entry. TN, H-1B1, and E-3 visas have become more popular throughout the period of binding H-1B limits. Moreover, the percentage of H-1B visas issued to citizens of these countries peaked at 4.7% in fiscal year 2003 and steadily declined to 2.8% in 2008. 12 Since workers from Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Australia have viable alternatives to the H-1B visa and face fewer constraints in entering the U.S. labor force, college-educated workers from those five control countries seeking U.S. employment should be largely unaffected by H-1B policy changes. In terms of research design, foreign applicants from these five countries form a control group, and all other foreign applicants comprise the treatment group.
Evidence that restrictive H-1B policy reduced the number of foreign undergraduates interested in U.S. education can be seen in summary data available from the Institute of International Education (IIE). It reports that undergraduate enrollment of students from the five control countries remained constant (at around 25,000) between academic years 2001/2 and 2006/7. Conversely, U.S. undergraduate enrollment from treatment countries declined by 14% (from 243,815 to 208,581) over the same period. Note also that markedly differential trends do not exist for graduate enrollment: the number of conrol country graduate students rose 1%, while the number of treatment country graduate students declined 2%. This regularity is especially informative given that individuals with advanced graduate degrees (such as a Ph.D.) who find eventual employment at U.S. academic institutions are exempt from H-1B quotas, and some professors and researchers can qualify for H-1B alternatives such as the EB-1 visa. The descriptive evidence therefore suggests that restrictive H-1B policy did reduce immigrant flows into 114 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS U.S. undergraduate programs. We hope to augment this evidence with a causal difference-in-difference estimation of the policy's effect on the average ability of foreign students interested in undergraduate U.S. education.
C. Student Ability Data
We use SAT scores as a measure of applicant ability despite the controversy in doing so. Many university admissions offices stress the importance of alternative criteria to standardized test scores. Rask and Tiefenthaler (2009, p. 1) note that "the chief complaint against the SAT is that it is not the best predictor of college success but is highly correlated with parental education and income." For example, highincome students might achieve high scores not through ability but rather by enrolling in private test preparation classes or through repeated exam attempts. Though Rask and Tiefenthaler find that SAT scores are better able to predict college performance for some demographic groups, the magnitude of the effects is not meaningful.
Geiser and Santelices (2007), like Rask and Tiefenthaler (2009) , advocate GPA as a preferred measure of ability. They use University of California data to perform a multivariate regression of cumulative four-year college GPA on high school GPA, verbal SAT score, and math SAT score. They find that a 1 standard deviation increase in high school GPA correlates with a 0.36 standard deviation increase in college GPA. A 1 standard deviation increase in verbal SAT scores correlates with a 0.23 standard deviation increase in college GPA. Math scores were insignificant. Bound, Hershbein, and Long (2009), Rothstein (2004) , and Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) provide additional SAT critiques.
Nonetheless, most SAT critiques focus on its ability to predict domestic student success (or they choose not to distinguish between domestic and international students in the analysis). The SAT for international students is offered less frequently and in more geographically dispersed areas, which should deter strategic test taking and multiple testing attempts. Many schools that choose not to require the SAT for domestic applicants still require it for international students, pointing to college admission offices' continued faith in the exam as a primary tool for assessing and comparing the ability of applicants from diverse countries and grading systems. Thus, we argue that the use of the SAT as a measure of applicant quality is probably more justifiable for international students.
Our primary data source is the College Board, which owns the SAT. This data set provides a sample of foreign-national high school seniors who took the SAT outside the United States between November 2000 and March 2008, dropping those who have dual U.S. citizenship or are permanent U.S. residents. A student may take the SAT multiple times, but the data record the math and verbal scores from only the last exam that the student completed. It also includes demographic information about the student that he or she supplied to the College Board. Each available observation represents a unique SAT score report sent to a U.S. college or university. Students might ultimately decide against applying to these schools officially; hence, score reports provide a measure of the quality of prospective students as opposed to actual applicants. 13 We do not know the date on which a student requested the exam scores be sent to particular universities, and we assume that they did so at the latest exam date. 14 Since individual students are likely to send multiple reports from a single exam, the data set records several observations per student.
We are interested in whether the academic qualifications (SAT scores) of foreign nationals interested in U.S. education have changed in response to more restrictive H-1B policy. The appropriate methodology is to compare the average scores of reports received by U.S. schools before and after the policy change. Unfortunately, information identifying specific schools is not available since the College Board wishes to preserve institutional privacy. Instead, it attached user-defined school characteristics to the data set. We know four characteristics: the region of the country in which the school is located as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the school's funding source (public or private), school type (research, liberal arts, and so forth), and school tier (or quality). We then define pseudo-schools by their type, tier, funding, and region. We aggregate individual score report information accordingly.
School type and tier characteristics are determined by the 2009 US News and World Report Guide to America's Best Colleges (USNWR)
. USNWR provides a single rank of U.S. colleges and universities that is determined by several criteria, including enrollee SAT scores, student-to-faculty ratio, and academic reputation among peer institutions. It is widely used by prospective students when choosing a school to attend. 15 The guide ranks institutions within four types: national research universities, national liberal arts colleges, master's-granting universities, and four-year baccalaureate schools. The ranking structure varies by school type in that the guide ranks master's-granting universities and baccalaureate schools within four geographic regions, whereas research universities and liberal arts colleges are compared nationally. The College Board supplied us with the type and general ranking of schools receiving SAT score reports. For research and liberal arts schools, we know whether a recipient school was ranked in the top 25, between numbers 26 and 50, between 51 and 100, other tier 1, tier 3, or tier 4 (there is no explicit tier 2). For the other institutions, we know if they were among the top 10, 11 to 25, other tier 1, tier 3, or tier 4 within their region. We use this to create a harmonized tier structure. We label research and liberal arts schools in the top 50 as "top tier," 51 to 100 and other tier 1 as "middle tier," while tiers 3 and 4 schools are "bottom tier." For master's and baccalaureate schools, we place the 40 top ten schools in the top tier, the 11 to 25 and other tier 1 institutions in the middle tier, and the remaining schools in the bottom tier. 16 Summary statistics for individual SAT score reports by type and tier of school are provided in table 1. Table 2 gives aggregate statistics. Average math, verbal, and total SAT scores were, respectively, 638, 552, and 1190. Higher-quality schools receive better SAT score reports, with the best scores generally going to liberal arts colleges.
For reasons discussed in Section 1, we supplement our analysis of College Board data with a case study of a highly selective college. Specifically, we were given full access to detailed information on each international applicant to this school, including SAT scores, high school GPA, and other personal characteristics. The data are available from 2001 through 2008. The key advantages of this data set are the use of standardized high school GPAs as an alternative to SAT scores and the focus on actual applicants as opposed to potential applicants.
D. Main Regression Specification
Data limitations do not allow direct empirical estimation of H-1B policy effects on individual decision-making behavior. The natural experiment methodology would require observation of an individual's interest in U.S. colleges and universities both before and after the policy changeinformation that is clearly unavailable. Instead, we can learn about the collective outcomes of individual decisions by 16 Students can and do elect to send reports to nonranked institutions, such as community colleges and proprietary schools. We choose to focus on the four school categories ranked in the annual US News and World Report survey of colleges. measuring the characteristics of the pool of individuals interested in U.S. education before and after the policy. That is, the natural experiment methodology requires aggregate-level regressions, given the available data.
To identify the effects of H-1B policy on the abilities of prospective applicants from abroad, we estimate the simple difference-in-difference model in equation (1):
The variable Score is our primary measure of the academic quality of international applicants, measured by the average math, verbal, or combined SAT score reports received by pseudo-school s from students who last took the exam in country c at date t. The model is specified from the viewpoint relevant to university admissions committees. That is, it represents the average ability of students from country c who have expressed an interest in pseudo-school s at date t. Given that students express interest in multiple schools, it is not possible to allocate individual people into unique cells. Individuals who send score reports to multiple schools form part of the average score for multiple observations. 17 The main coefficient of interest, β, measures the effect of the restrictive H-1B visa policy on the quality of score reports received by schools from foreign students interested in U.S. education, which we interpret as a change in applicant quality. In our baseline regressions, we assume that students taking the SAT in the month following a policy change are aware of that change, and hence they take the immigration policy change into consideration when deciding whether to take the SAT and send their scores to a U.S. school. equals 1 for all other observations. This implies that β will be negative if current (restrictive) visa policy has caused U.S. undergraduate institutions to see a decline in the academic qualifications of their prospective foreign students. The vector δ s controls for time-invariant fixed effects and idiosyncratic features specific to particular schools, while δ c does the same for countries. Also, δ t represents year effects for the most recent year in which the student took the exam. This controls for global macroeconomic conditions, common fluctuations in the costs and benefits of enrolling in a U.S. college, common trends in test-taking behavior, and possible changes in College Board testing procedures or score release policy. The error term is represented by ε s,c,t , and regressions weight cells by their inferred number of population score reports. 18 18 The College Board data are an unweighted sample within the academic year but weighted across years. Each report in the sample corresponds to between 1.4 and 5.3 reports in the population, depending on the academic year of observation.
There are two common threats to the validity of our difference-in-difference methodology. The first concerns the exogeneity of our policy (or treatment) variable. If the ability of foreign students from our five control countries somehow motivated their preferential visa consideration, or if some omitted variable is correlated with the variation of both policy and scores across these two groups, the estimated β cannot be interpreted as causal. These scenarios seem unlikely. First, the return to a restrictive H-1B visa regime was likely motivated by macroeconomic forces that apply to interested immigrants from all countries. The United States experienced a recession between March and November 2001. The unemployment rate of native workers with a bachelor's degree rose over 75% from 1.8% in 2000 to 3.2% in 2003-the minimum and maximum values between 1994 and 2008. 19 Section IVC more fully addresses the consequences of macroeconomic fluctuations, but most macroeconomic concerns should be accounted for by each regression's time dummies. Second, variation in policy across countries is unrelated to macroeconomic conditions. Alternative visas set aside for the five control countries were a result of preexisting or concurrently negotiated free trade agreements. It is unlikely that removal of these special visas would have been politically feasible. Moreover, we see no plausible story to suggest that free trade agreements and the ability of foreign high school students are related.
The second threat to identification would arise if our treatment and five control countries had experienced differential trends in SAT performance prior to the change in H-1B policy. This would cause our regression to erroneously identify a policy effect that was instead due to differences in prepolicy trend behavior. Fortunately, this limitation does not appear to afflict our model. Between academic years 2000/1 and 2002/3, average SAT scores rose 4% (from 1122 to 1167) for treatment countries that would later face H-1B restrictions. Scores rose a qualitatively equal 3.9% (from 1181 to 1226) for our five control countries. Prepolicy regressions (available on request) reveal no relationship between the trend in scores received by pseudo-schools and whether scores are coming from treatment or control countries. Altogether, we believe our difference-in-difference strategy remains valid.
IV. Results
A. Main Results from College Board Data
Baseline results are in table 3. Results for math scores are in columns 1 to 3, verbal scores are in columns 4 to 6, and total scores are in columns 7 to 9. Each regression uses year fixed effects. The first specification for each dependent variable includes origin country plus receiving school fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country. The second and third instead use School × Country fixed effects with standard errors clustered by this unique identifier.
The estimated coefficients on H1B s,c,t when applicant characteristics are not controlled for are negative and statistically significant at least at the 5% level except when the average SAT verbal score is used as the dependent variable. The size of the estimated coefficients suggests that recent H-1B visa restrictions have reduced the average math SAT score of foreign prospective students by about 8.5 points, verbal scores by about 10 points, and combined scores by 18.5 points.
To see if the results change when we account for applicant characteristics that might be correlated with their academic quality, we add a variety of applicant characteristics as controls. The results are shown in columns 3, 6, and 9. Added controls include a school's share of applicants who are sure to apply for financial aid, intend to play intercollegiate sports, and plan to earn an advanced degree. We also include demographic controls for gender, race, and parental education. 20 Reassuringly, the sign and size of the estimated coefficients on H1B s,c,t change little, and they continue to be statistically significant (in fact, even more significant than without these controls). The only meaningful change in the size of the coefficients concerns the average verbal score, which rises a bit when the additional controls are used.
Webster (2001) argues that SAT scores of enrolled students were the most important determinant of research universities' USNWR rankings in 1999. From his published results, we can infer that a 1 point increase in SAT score corresponds to a 0.20 improvement in the rankings. Alternatively, figure 3 displays the relationship between SAT scores and the more recent 2009 USNWR rankings of national research and liberal arts universities, which suggests that a 1 point rise in SAT scores is associated with a 0.29 improvement in the ranking. 21 If the average score among enrollees were to drop by the same amount as the decline among international prospective students (roughly 20 points), it would be associated with a 4-to-6-place loss in USNWR ranking. Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of equation (1) but with log scores as the dependent variables. The results are robust to this alternative specification, suggesting that restrictive H-1B policy caused prospective student scores to drop by a significant 1.4% to 1.5%.
B. Timing Issues in Identifying Average Score Effects
The baseline results of tables 3 and 4 suggest that U.S. colleges are receiving lower average quality score reports from foreign students as a result of restrictive H-1B visa policy. However, those effects could be subject to a number of timing issues that we consider in this section.
First, we explore potential seasonality in the data. Seasonality could occur, for example, if repeated test attempts result in higher averages than first attempts and are disproportionately represented in particular months. Since our data set does not identify the number of times an individual has taken the exam, we cannot control for repeated attempts, but we can account for seasonality by controlling for the month and year in which an exam was taken.
The first row of results in columns 1 to 3 of table 5 repeats the regressions in columns 2, 5, and 8 of table 3, but they replace year indicators with year-by-month exam date fixed effects. The second row of results does this for the natural log regressions of table 4. One limitation of this approach is that the SAT is not offered in all countries on all potential exam dates. This approach will also reduce variation in the data 21 Webster (2001) uses a sample of 114 research universities. He reports a standard deviation of average SAT scores among enrolled students equal to 129.55. The correlation between scores and school rank is −0.78. If schools are ranked from 1 to 114, the standard deviation of rank would be 33, and the slope coefficient would be −0.20. Our estimate comes from a simple bivariate regression of research university and liberal arts college rank on the average of first and third quartile SAT scores of enrolled students among institutions reporting SAT scores to USNWR. Our regression produces a coefficient of −0.293, standard error of 0.013, and R 2 of 0.74. Unit of observation is Pseudo-School × Country of Origin × Year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by country-of-origin in columns (1), (4), and (7), and by pseudo-school * country cells in the other columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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and decrease the efficiency of estimates. Nonetheless, this robustness check could be important if visa policy changes were correlated with SAT seasonality.
The results for math SAT scores are strikingly similar to those of baseline regressions. Without seasonality controls (table 3, column 2), binding visa policy reduced math scores by 8.4 points. With seasonality controls, the estimate increases to a 9.9 point loss. Both methodologies suggest a decline of 1.2% to 1.4% in math scores when measuring the dependent variable in logs. The effect of policy on verbal scores, by contrast, disappears. This mitigates the total SAT score effect so that restrictive policy reduces scores by 9.8 points (or 0.6%). The robustness of the results for math scores is especially encouraging. One might argue that math scores are a better measure of foreign student ability, while English verbal scores are likely to be a noisier measure of general intellectual ability. For example, those who grow up in an English-speaking environment will probably score high.
Another potential timing issue is difficulty in identifying the date at which foreign students respond to policy. Baseline results assume that test takers respond in the month following the policy change. Column 4 of table 5 instead assumes that test takers respond in the month of the policy change, whereas column 5 assumes that people respond two months after the policy change. The results do not change much across assumptions, pointing to the robustness of our key result. Finally, the College Board data set unfortunately does not measure the date on which a student elects to send a score report to a given school. This is a problem for our results if students who had taken the exam before the policy change then respond to it by selecting a new group of schools to receive reports. Column 6 addresses this issue by assuming that people apply to matriculate to universities in the fall of the year following their SAT date. , as students who tested in the early part of the year can still respond by sending their score reports to alternative schools. Column 6 indicates that the SAT quality response to H-1B policy is again robust to this timing assumption. The combined score drops by more than 13 points.
C. Macroeconomic Conditions and Country Exclusions
Estimation of equation (1) could be biased if U.S. policy dates are correlated with country-specific macroeconomic events or trends. We first explore these potential biases in table 6 by excluding countries that pose particular concern. The empirical specification is comparable to column 3 of table 5: regressions are weighted, are cluster robust, and include exam date fixed effects.
Column 1 considers countries bound by H-1B constraints that experienced unique changes during our period of analysis. First, China and India are undergoing rapid economic development. Second, Bulgaria and Romania signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Union in April 2005 and formally joined the EU in January 2007. These developments could possibly deter students from considering U.S. education. For China and India, domestic schooling and employment options may be becoming more attractive. For Bulgaria and Romania, the EU now provides less expensive schooling and greater labor market access. Eliminating these four countries from regressions, however, does not affect qualitative results: coefficient estimates are nearly identical to those of column 3 in table 5.
Our results are identified by a natural experiment in which the immigration policy change affects all but five key countries. Roughly two-thirds of score reports among control countries come from Canadians, and another quarter come from Singaporeans. Columns 2 and 3 omit score reports sent from citizens of these respective countries. Though this affects magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, the qualitative conclusions remain intact.
South Korea and Australia are among countries that have actively tried to increase recruitment of foreign undergraduate students. 22 Time fixed effects control for increases in the competitiveness of world education, and there is little reason to expect that changes in competitiveness should attract students from our control group countries more or less than students from treatment countries. Nonetheless, the regression in column 4 explores the possibility by omitting Asian and Oceanic countries-that is, countries near South Korea and Australia that could serve as the primary source of their foreign student body. The regressions continue to confirm that restrictive H-1B policy reduced the quality of potential applicants to U.S. universities.
Country exclusions alone do not fully account for two further macroeconomic concerns. First, prospective students from less developed countries might be especially likely to think about studying in the United States as a pathway to permanent migration and therefore be more sensitive to H-1B policy changes. We test for differential effects across developed and less developed countries by interacting our policy variable with a dichotomous indicator for whether the source country is in the OECD.
Second, though year fixed effects already account for macroeconomic conditions, those conditions might have a heterogeneous effect if economic fluctuations and countryspecific immigrant representation vary across industries. For example, if prospective Indian undergraduate students are more likely than prospective Mexican undergraduates to find eventual employment with U.S. information technology (IT) firms, they will be more interested in the economic conditions of the American IT sector. In that case, an economic slump in American IT would reduce the quality of prospective undergraduates from India, but the quality of prospective Mexican students would remain fairly constant. Differences in country-specific immigrant representation in U.S. industries could therefore generate a heterogeneous effect of Unit of observation is Pseudo-School × Country of Origin × Year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by country-of-origin in columns (1), (4), and (7), and by pseudo-school * country cells in the other columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations across origin countries, subjecting our estimates to omitted variable bias. 23 23 A political economy argument could suggest a related problem of endogenous correlation between restrictive H-1B policy and the heterogeneous effect of U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations across source countries. In our example of Indian and Mexican immigration to the United States, deteriorating conditions in the IT sector could lead to a reduction in available H-1B visas since the industry would be less able to lobby against barriers to migration. Thus, sectoral economic shocks could be correlated with visa policy. Nonetheless, we believe such bias is less serious in our natural experimental framework since our policy effect is identified by selective country exemptions from restrictive immigration policy due to free trade agreements. Even if visa restrictions were endogenously determined by reduced lobbying for freer immigration, it is difficult to develop a sensible theory in which reduced lobbying determined both the visa restrictions and the selective exemption of our five control nations. In other words, we are fairly confident that political economy theories of endogenous visa policy will not be a major threat to our analysis, given our natural experiment framework.
To control for this potential heterogeneity, we first record BEA data on U.S. industrial output (GDP) produced in each of nineteen aggregated sectors in each year of our data set (GDP i,t , where i = industry and t = year). 24 Second, we use Census data from King et al. (2010) to calculate the fraction of an origin country's college-educated U.S. migrant workforce employed in each industry in 2000 (L c,i,2000 /L c,2000 , where L c,2000 represents the total number of college-educated U.S. immigrant workers from country c in 2000). Third, 24 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining; utilities; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing, excluding postal service; information; finance and insurance; real estate and rental and leasing; professional and technical services; management of companies and enterprises; administrative and waste services; educational services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation; accommodation and food services; and other services, except government. Unit of observation is Pseudo-School × Country of Origin × Year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by Pseudo-School × Country-of-Origin cells. Estimates assume different dates for individual responses to announced policy changes as described in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects: SAT date, School × Country. Unit of observation is Pseudo-School × Country of Origin × Year. All regressions include SAT Date and School × Country fixed effects, and are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by Pseudo-School × Country-of-Origin Cells. Weighted U.S. GDP calculation described in text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects: SAT date, School × Country.
we use these proportions to compute the weighted average of industry-level U.S. GDP relevant to a college-educated potential U.S. immigrant worker from country c in year t:
(2) This weighted average accounts for differences in the industrial distribution of college-educated U.S. immigrants across source countries, capturing the U.S. macroeconomic conditions in year t that are specific to college-educated potential U.S. migrants from country c. In other words, it reflects the relevant health of the US economy anticipated by potential immigrant workers if they expect to enter the same industries as their fellow countrymen but are aware of industry-specific macroshocks. Country-specific industrial share values vary substantially across origin countries. For example, 25% of Indian-born college-educated U.S. employees worked in the professional and technical services industry (a sector that includes computer systems design and related services), whereas only 8% of Mexican-born college-educated workers were in this sector. It is therefore reasonable to expect economic shocks to technical services to have a differential effect on treatment versus control countries in our sample.
Column 5 displays the results for regressions with our added controls. Note that regressions use fixed effects so that the coefficients are identified by changes within a country (the model cannot identify a coefficient on an OECD indicator alone). Most important, the controls do little to alter the coefficients on the policy variable: results are quite similar to those of comparable specifications in column 3 of table 5. 25 As such, our key finding of restrictive H-1B policy's adverse effect on the quality of international applications to U.S. schools is robust to these additional macroeconomic concerns. Column 5 does reveal a few noteworthy findings, however. First, the estimated coefficient on the OECD interaction term is positive and significant when SAT scores are measured in levels, and it is nearly significant when measured in logs. SAT scores from developed countries are indeed less affected by restrictive immigration policy than low-income countries are. (The policy effect for OECD source countries equals the sum of the coefficients on the policy variable and the interaction term, and is insignificant.) In other words, potential applicants from low-income countries are more sensitive to diminished labor market opportunities. Second, results for effects from industry GDP are more mixed. When SAT scores are measured in levels, results suggest that fluctuations in anticipated U.S. macroeconomic conditions may have some positive effect on the academic qualifications of prospective foreign student applications-a 1% increase in weighted industry GDP is associated with a 5.8-point drop in SAT scores. However, the coefficient is far from significant in the log SAT regression. In sum, even if sectoral economic conditions affect residents of some countries more than others, such fluctuations have no bearing on the relationship between restrictive immigration policy and the quality of potential undergraduate students.
D. Compositional and Demographic Effects
The College Board data set is rich enough that we can explore a number of additional issues surrounding the effects of the restrictive H-1B policy. First, table 7 assesses whether the effects differ across type and quality of institution. Policy seems to have been least harmful for research schools, which saw an SAT point drop of just 7.5 points. Liberal arts and master's-granting schools saw declines that were twice as large. Baccalaureate losses were even larger, though we caution that only 1.6% of score reports are sent to baccalaureate institutions. Not surprisingly, elite schools are less harmed by policy than middle-and bottom-tier institutions. In the final set of results, we differentiate top research schools from all others. The general effect of restrictive policy was to reduce SAT scores of potential students by 14 points. Top research schools mitigated this decline by a significant 8.4, but still suffered losses. Table 8 explores the policy's effect on the demographic composition of potential applicants. These results might be particularly relevant for institutions that use international students to enhance the diversity of their student body. Column 1 considers gender composition: visa restrictions have had no effect. The next four columns explore racial composition. Restrictive H-1B policy has come at the expense of Asian applicants. The share of score reports from international Asian students decreased by 7.6 percentage points. Whites, in contrast, saw a 5.9 percentage point increase in applicant share. In interpreting these coefficients, however, recall that regressions already control for countryof-origin fixed effects. Thus, racial composition effects are driven by variation of application rates of students within countries.
Column 6 shows that restrictive H-1B policy has increased the proportion of applicants intending to continue their education after obtaining a bachelor's degree. This is not at all surprising given that students pursuing graduate work would not want or need an H-1B visa to matriculate at a graduate school. In addition, we have already noted that those with advanced graduate degrees employed at academic institutions are exempt from H-1B quotas. 26 Finally, column 7 suggests that the policy change has caused demand for financial aid by international students to increase. Foreign applicants facing a decline in the expected benefit of graduating from U.S. colleges now find U.S. education relatively more costly. One response has been to demand a price discount in the form of financial aid.
E. Quintile Regressions
While baseline results effectively established that universities have seen a decline in average applicant ability in response to H-1B visa restrictions, they are not informative about the parts of the ability distribution most affected. Colleges and policymakers might have a particular interest in whether the observed drop in average ability comes mostly from reduced interest among high-ability students or a rise in applications from low-ability students. To address this issue, we divide score reports into quintiles of the ability distribution of the prebinding policy period (exams taken on or before spring 2003). 27 We then calculate the share (r) of a pseudo-school's reports (R) from country c at time t 26 In principle, we could analyze whether H-1B restrictions affect the quality of the international graduate school applicant pool. GRE data would permit the most direct assessment, but the Education Testing Service, owners of the GRE, would not provide the necessary data. We have performed unreported regressions using SAT data to explore differential policy effects between students who intend to pursue advanced degrees and other students, but we find that both groups experience equal declines in SAT scores. It is possible that low-quality international applicants hedge against restrictive H-1B visa policy by changing their postgraduation plans from seeking immediate employment to enrolling in graduate degree programs. Hence, the average quality of the total pool of international graduate applicants can fall even if committed graduate degree seekers (those whose relevant decision is not about whether to seek graduate degrees but rather about where to earn their graduate degrees) are unaffected by the H-1B visa policy change. 27 28 The effects are particularly strong at the tails of the ability distribution: restrictive immigration policy reduces the number of score reports received by U.S. schools from the weakest and strongest students. The proportion of lowest-ability reports declined 3.3 percentage points due to H-1B visa restrictions, helping to reject the hypothesis that the observed drop in average ability comes from the proliferation of weak applications. In addition, the proportion of highest-ability score reports dropped 1.8 percentage points. The decline in average SAT scores therefore appears to be attributable to reduced interest among high-ability students, a result that is especially worrisome from a policymaking point of view.
We check the robustness of this result by considering an alternative specification. We replace the denominator of our dependent variable (r s,c,t,q ) withR s,c , the average number of score reports received by school s from country c in a given time period. Since this value is fixed across time, it is robust to any possible effect of restrictive policy on the total number of score reports sent; all estimated effects occur through the number of reports sent at a given quintile. The second row of panel A reports the results of this alternative specification and confirms that restrictive policy is reducing the number of score reports received from both the lowest-and highestability foreign students.
Panel B of table 9 provides further evidence on the source of the score report declines. In principle, international students can respond to restrictive policy through two adjustments. We have implicitly assumed that students react through the extensive margin-that is, that restrictive policy reduces the number of international applicants to U.S. schools. Students might also respond on the intensive margin, however. That is, a student intending to pursue a U.S. undergraduate degree might react to policy by changing the total number of applications he or she sends. The costs of H-1B restrictions are less concerning if policy affects the intensive margin (fewer SAT score reports per applicant) but not the extensive margin (the total number of students interest in US education). Panel B of table 9 explores this issue and accounts for intensive margin adjustment by controlling for the average number of applications each applicant sends. Estimated coefficients on our H-1B visa policy variable are insensitive to this control. In other words, the policy-induced decline in top-quintile score reports is driven by a fall in the actual number of international students interested in U.S. undergraduate education. 29 
F. Case Study
The College Board data present three remaining problems. First, they provide only one measure of ability, SAT scores, which some researchers consider an inferior measure of applicant ability as compared to high school GPA (though these critiques are usually aimed at evaluations of domestic applicants). Second, the College Board data cannot be strictly interpreted as a sample of foreign applicants but is rather a sample of foreign prospective applicants. This is because it includes both applicants and those who sent SAT scores to U.S. schools but later declined to submit a formal and complete application. We cannot distinguish between these two groups of individuals in the College Board data. Third, results may be confounded by remaining timing issues, including the challenge of precisely identifying the dates on which individual behavior would respond to a policy change.
Our second data set is assembled to account for these problems. It includes every foreign national officially applying to matriculate at a particular highly selective university between fall 2001 and fall 2008. As in the case of the College Board data, we drop individuals who have dual U.S. citizenship or are permanent U.S. residents. The use of the applicant data (as opposed to the College Board's prospective student data) reduces ambiguity surrounding the timing of international applicants' awareness of H-1B policy changes since students should be aware of the current policy at the time of application submission. 30 Finally, the data set also includes a measure of high school GPA. Raw GPAs would be greatly confounded by grading system differences across countries. Fortunately, this university's admissions office, using its long experience with overseas high schools, resolved this issue by converting raw values into an internationally comparable GPA measured on a four-point scale. Values therefore represent GPAs that this university uses to evaluate international applicants.
Our regression methodology is similar to the specification in equation (1). The dependent variables now reflect the average abilities of applicants to this particular university. Observations vary by country of origin and year of application. The model includes both country and year fixed effects but obviously omits institutional controls. Regressions weight observations by the total number of applicants from country c at year t, and standard errors are clustered by country. For the policy variable, we now assume that students perceived H-1B policy to be nonbinding if they applied to enter college before 2004; if they applied from Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Singapore in any year; or if they were from Australia applying to enter college in any year except 2004. Table 10 provides results for dependent variables measured in both levels and logs. As in the previous prospective applicant regressions with controls for seasonality, the policy effects are again most prominent for math scores. Column 1 demonstrates that the math SAT scores of applicants from countries subject to binding H-1B constraints have declined by 13 points relative to the scores among applicants from countries who have H-1B alternatives. Measured in logs, this suggests a 2.2% decline in average ability of international applicants. For overall SAT scores, in contrast, the estimate is negative but not statistically different from zero. This may be due to sample size, which is much smaller than with the College Board data set. It is worth emphasizing that the point estimates of the total score penalty in percentage terms are quite similar in the two samples. For prospective international applicants, H-1B restrictions reduced total scores by about 1.5%. For this university's actual applicants, scores reduced by 1.2%.
Perhaps most important, column 4 presents the results using high school GPA. We again see evidence that restrictive H-1B policy is reducing the quality of international applicants. The average GPA of international applicants at this university declined by 0.09 points, or 2.8% when measured in logs, a magnitude higher than that of any of the SAT regressions. The estimated effects on average GPA of restrictive H-1B policy are statistically significant at the 5% level.
V. Conclusion
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide rigorous evidence on the effects of restrictive immigration policy on the quality of international students interested in US tertiary education. The analysis employed two data sets: College Board data on the SAT scores of prospective students and SAT and GPA data on a highly selective university's foreign applicants. Both cases generate robust evidence that limits on H-1B immigration of educated labor have had an unintended adverse effect on U.S. higher education by reducing the average ability (or quality) of potential foreign applicants.
Unfortunately, a lack of available data prevents us from further investigating to what extent the weakened pool of foreign applicants will translate into lower-quality matriculates and graduates. Nonetheless, the key findings from our quintile regressions, combined with summary statistics from the Institute for International Education, shed light on this issue. IIE data note that U.S. undergraduate enrollment of students from countries bound by H-1B restrictions declined by 14% between academic years 2001/2 and 2006/7. U.S. policymakers are unlikely to be concerned if such losses occur at the left tail of the ability distribution. Our analysis, however, shows that the share of applications from top-quintile students declined by 1.8 to 3.7 percentage points. It is unlikely that U.S. undergraduate institutions maintained a high number of top-quality international enrollees in the face of declining applications from top-quality students.
Lower-quality foreign-born students would directly affect the classroom experience for domestic students, whose education is often enriched by the presence of motivated, wellprepared, and diverse international classmates. Universities and their students therefore suffer an immediate welfare loss due to restrictive immigration policy. Lower-quality graduates would imply even more important macroeconomic consequences, however, since many international students continue to work in the United States after graduation. Such individuals have proven to be especially effective in innovative and entrepreneurial activity, boosting aggregate productivity. With more lower-ability individuals seeking entry into the United States, the country may ultimately sacrifice those aggregate gains.
Given recent political developments in public opinion regarding highly educated immigrants, it is increasingly important to design policy to maximize the benefit of skill-based immigration. By providing evidence on a potentially serious adverse effect of current H-1B immigration restrictions, this paper points to a need for policy reassessment.
